Statement of the argument
The new posture of international courts and tribunals is the "spirit of systemic harmonization," to use the words of the European Court of Human Rights Grand Chamber in Al Dulimi. 1 More than fifteen years after the "proliferation"-speech given by the thenthe academic fragmentation debate were the first decade of the millennium. PierreMarie Dupuy devoted his 2000 General Course in the Hague Summer Academy to the issue. 14 An important symposium on "diversity or cacophony" was held at Michigan Law School (with contributions, inter alia, by Hafner, Teubner, and Simma) which resulted in a 500-page journal issue in 2004. 15 While the debate initially sought to understand, conceptualize, and evaluate fragmentation, it later concentrated more on developing principles and procedures for coordinating and harmonizing the pieces, and for solving conflicts. 16 And while in 2007, fragmentation was feared to possibly break apart the international order, 17 in 2017, the "integrationist forces" of fragmentation have been duly praised. 
Causes of fragmentation
The causes of fragmentation seem to be both functional and political. First of all, fragmentation is built into the decentralized structure of international law which results from the absence of a central world legislator. Second, and connected to the former, fragmentation originates in the domestic sphere: different issue-areas are handled by different departments of government which negotiate different treaties, and different administrative authorities then apply them. Third, fragmentation is a response to globalization. Global problems (ranging from climate deterioration over migration and terrorism to the financial crisis) have triggered a demand for more international, and also more special regulation. 19 The political causes may be more interesting. States negotiating treaties normally have different views about policy priorities which translate into relationships between different regimes, for example trade agreements and treaties on cultural or biological diversity. When the states are unable to reach a political solution through treaty design, they leave texts deliberately open-ended, for example, the non-economic exceptions in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), or Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT-Agreement). The buck is thus passed to the law-appliers, including arbitrators, to possibly "integrate" the regimes, at the occasion of a concrete legal dispute.
Moreover, realist analyses have depicted fragmentation as the result of a deliberate agenda of powerful states. 20 Benvenisti and Downs have argued that fragmentation serves the latters' interests because it limits the bargaining power of weaker See Prost, supra note 11, at 9. 17 Benedetto Conforti, L'Unité et fragmentation du droit international: "Glissez, mortels, n'appuyez pas!," in 111 revue générAle de droit internAtionAl PubliC 5, 5 (2007). The title alludes to a thin and possibly deceiving "surface" of international law.
states (which cannot group up within one forum but are isolated in a multitude of settings) and because only those states with a greater "agenda-setting power" 21 can easily create alternative regimes which suit their interests better. The authors identify four fragmentation strategies: avoiding broad regulatory regimes, one-time negotiations (no mechanisms to update agreements), avoiding the creation of authoritative institutions (courts, administrations). The fourth strategy is "regime shifting," that is creating a new regime as soon as the original regime becomes too responsive to the interests of weaker states (the latter are protected by rules which constrain the actors and through the principle of legal equality). 22 While it is not clear whether Benvenisti and Downs have-beyond the anecdotal examples given-revealed a behavioral pattern that is strategically motivated and in fact has hegemonic effects, 23 their analysis has the merit of politicizing the facially technical fragmentation debate. It draws attention to the loss of overall legitimacy connected to fragmentation.
Types of fragmentation
Taxonomies of fragmentation differ. For example, we might distinguish "functional" fragmentation from regional ("geographic"/"territorial") fragmentation. 24 Two relevant facets seem to be the institutional fragmentation (different treaties, organizations, bodies, courts) and the ideational fragmentation (different objectives and values). These two facets flow into each other, assuming that each institution (Conference of the Parties (COP), dispute settlement body, etc.) tends to favor the values and objective of its own regime, be it only because the lawmakers and law-appliers know that regime better than competing ones (the expertise-based bias).
The ILC-works on the law of international (state) responsibility, mostly in the 1970s and 1980s, ventilated the idea of regimes which prescribe and control all reactions to breaches of their norms. Any recourse to the general law of international responsibility, notably to counter-measures, would then be precluded (self-contained régimes). The ICJ applied this concept once and qualified the "rules of diplomatic law" as a "selfcontained régime." 25 That term is obsolete. For reasons of structural coherence and policy results, there are and should be no sealed-off regimes. 26 General international law always constitutes the normative environment, and is applicable to fill gaps or when the rules of a given regime cannot in themselves fulfill the regime's stated objectives. The ILC study of 2006 therefore suggested the label "special treaty-regimes" instead.
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Id. at 615. 22 Id. at 599, in detail at 610-619. 23 Critically Michael Zürn & Benjamin Faude, On Fragmentation, Differentiation and Coordination, in 13 glob. env'l Pol. 119, 125-126 (2013) . 24 In trade law, investment law, and human rights law, we find both universal and regional agreements. More importantly, we can distinguish between fragmentation in lawmaking and fragmentation in law-application. As just mentioned, the political process of developing international (treaty) law results in fragmented law, either for lack of political agreement on inter-regime relations, or due to the hegemonic interest of powerful lawmaking states (see Section 2.2). But even if fragmentation were avoided in lawmaking, the law could be (further) fragmented by the autonomous law-appliers. The adoption of overarching, multi-issue treaties (in the form of "linkages" of different subject matters, e.g., trade and labor) would not necessarily eliminate conflicts in law-application, because there are often no strict incompatibilities of different broad objectives (such as promoting free trade and promoting laborers' welfare), but rather merely tensions arising from the prioritization of different objectives. Actual conflicts normally only arise in the concrete case at hand, i.e. in law-application and dispute resolution.
Typical issue-areas among which strains may arise are free trade in tension with environmental and species protection, 28 or with human rights/labor rights. 29 These antagonisms can-somewhat simplistically-be framed as conflicts between "private" interests (property, contract) and the (global) public interest, even if-at least in the theory and experience of free market economy/capitalism-the protection of those private rights has trickle down benefits for (some) other market participants and society at large.
As far as the protection of property and other rights or interests of foreign investors are concerned, the necessity that the law-appliers (including courts and tribunals) reconcile the private (property) rights and public interests now arises in international law just as it is familiar from domestic law. The identification of public purposes which would allow, e.g., an expropriation, normally falls within the domaine réservé of the host state. But these public purposes can be, and indeed are, informed and shaped by international law. This means that norms of other specific branches of international law which embody public interests such as environmental law 30 The Vattenfall I case illustrates the friction between investment protection and (international) environmental law. German authorities here denied or delayed water and emission permits for a Swedish power plant project in order to comply (at least so it was argued) with commitments under international environmental law such as the EU Water Framework Directive and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This stood in tension with the state's obligations under the Energy Charter heritage law 31 might come into play for the definition of the public interest, and will flow into the exercise of balancing and reconciling private investor interests with the host state's policy goals. The area and subfield most discussed thus far is international human rights law. It seems to collide with international investment protection in the following typical constellation: the privatization of infrastructure (service public), notably water services, partly required by the World Bank from developing states, has often attracted foreign investors. Measures taken by host states, such as repudiation of lease contracts, failure to improve facilities, negative propaganda, or lowering of water prices have been attacked by investors before arbitral tribunals with the argument that the host state violated the investment contracts and international investment law. It has therefore been suggested that "human rights and sustainable development issues are factors that condition the nature and extent of the investor's responsibilities, and the balance of rights and obligations as between the investor and the host State." This would mean that "foreign corporations engaged in projects intimately related to human rights and the capacity to achieve sustainable development . . ., have the highest level of responsibility to meet their duties and obligations as foreign investors, before seeking the protection of international law. This is precisely because such investments necessarily carry with them very serious risks to the population at large." Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. and expropriation which was ultimately unsuccessful. Argentina had filed a counterclaim for damages alleging Urbaser's "failure to provide the necessary investment into the Concession, thereby violating its commitments and its obligations under international law based on the human right to water." 34 The tribunal rejected this counterclaim but it made some important statements on the corporation's human rights obligations. According to the tribunal, a private company does not have a positive obligation to fulfill the human right to water directly, flowing from international human rights law.
35
[Such an obligation] cannot be imposed on any company knowledgeable in the field of provision of water and sanitation services. In order to have such an obligation to perform applicable to a particular investor, a contract or similar legal relationship of civil and commercial law is required. In such a case, the investor's obligation to perform has as its source domestic law; it does not find its legal ground in general international law.
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This proceeding is an example of how a respondent state brought an investment tribunal to integrate two different subfields of international law. The tribunal, composed of investment law experts under the presidency of a Swiss private law scholar who had before published inter alia on human rights exceptions to immunity, did not shy away from examining international human rights law. It even went over the top in its obiter dictum affirming direct (horizontal) negative human rights obligations of private actors 37 which probably goes beyond the current state of general human rights law. It is doubtful whether the fragmentation-i.e., the dispersal of the relevant rules among the different branches of international law-changes anything in the outcomes of such balancing decisions. Using the example of investment protection, the balancing of property rights versus human rights (be it in the technical guise of addressing a counterclaim of a host state or within the principal claim of the investor) would also have to be made by law-appliers if all relevant norms were united in one single treaty.
Fragmentation as a problem
The institutional, procedural, and substantive diversification called "fragmentation" bears risks. First of all, fragmentation may create conflicts and incompatibilities of legal obligations. A conflict in a narrow sense is present when mutually incompatible obligations arise from diverging rules. These are often treaty conflicts, but also conflicts with or among new types of norms such as codes of conducts, memoranda, and so on. 34 Id. ¶. 36.
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"The human right to water entails an obligation of compliance on the part of the State, but it does not contain an obligation for performance on part of any company providing the contractually required service." (Id. ¶ 1207). 36 Id. ¶ 1210.
37
" [T] he situation would be different in case an obligation to abstain, like a prohibition to commit acts violating human rights would be at stake. Such an obligation can be of immediate application, not only upon States, but equally to individuals and other private parties." (Id. ¶ 1210).
Beyond this, one treaty (or soft regime) may frustrate the goals of another one without there being strict conflict. For example, a more liberalized trade increases greenhouse gas emission levels due to the scale effect. Greenhouse gas-emitting states saddled with the legal obligation to maintain low tariffs under trade regimes may be tempted to avoid assuming significant commitments under climate change regimes because this may affect their competitiveness. Such strategic behavior mutes the ultimate goals of the UNFCCC even if no legal rule has been breached. Similar incompatibilities short of outright conflicts exist between investment protection and immunity of enforcement. When a foreign investor may not enforce a favorable arbitral award, for example through the attachment of state property in governmental non-commercial use, due to the international law of immunity, this frustrates the objectives of international investment law.
Fragmentation also engenders losses of legal certainty which is in turn an element of the (global) rule of law. The multiplicity of institutions (especially of courts and tribunals) creates conflicts over potentially overlapping jurisdictions of those courts.
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The diverging and possibly conflicting legal norms in substance that are available to those bodies reduce the predictability and reliability of law application. The resulting insecurity is both procedural (e.g., relating to jurisdiction and admissibility of complaints) and substantive. Law-users may exploit the fragmentation (and the diverse institutional outlooks going with it) through forum-shopping and regime-shifting, based on the strategic consideration which forum and regime will respond best to their claims based on their parochial interest.
More generally speaking, a potentially pernicious consequence is the loss of the unity 39 and coherence of international law. Granted, international lawyers should not fetishize coherence. Coherence is, as the ILC study points out, only "a formal and abstract virtue. For a legal system that is regarded in some respects as unjust or unworkable, no added value is brought by the fact of its being coherently so." 40 On the other hand, a loss of coherence implies the loss of international law's quality as a legal order (or system). An agglomeration of isolated and diverse norms does not amount to a legal order. Recall that Herbert L. A. Hart had notoriously dubbed international law as "rules which constitute not a system but a simple set."
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A legal order is present only when norms refer to each other (ordered norms). But legal order means not only ordered law but also order through law. These two dimensions are mutually reinforcing: The normative pull of international law is fortified by its stringency and consistency. 42 understanding why consistency is particularly important for international law (more than for domestic law): because its normative power is more precarious.
To conclude, what is at stake in fragmentation is unity, harmony, cohesion, order, and-concomitantly-the quality of international law as a truly normative order. Worries about this fact have been disparaged as a "postmodern anxiety" 43 in a world which has lost stable values. But is it not a justified concern that international law could "no longer be a singular endeavor, . . . but merely an empty rhetorical device that loosely describes the ambit of the various discourses in question"? 44 Without some glue holding together the "special regimes" and "institutional components," writes Georges Abi-Saab, "the special regime becomes a legal order unto itself-a kind of legal Frankenstein" that "no longer partakes in the same basis of legitimacy and formal standards of pertinence." 45 So ultimately, at the bottom of the fragmentation debate lies a concern for a loss of legitimacy of international law, a loss which will ultimately threaten that law's very existence.
Fragmentation as an opportunity
Fragmentation is beneficial, too. First of all, fragmentation is an adequate reaction to modernity and modern complexity of life. It is, to speak with Michael Zürn, "not the dissolution or decomposition of a pre-existing world polity or order, but rather an indicator for the emergence of a differentiated world polity or order."
46 Complexity requires differentiated norms and specialized law-appliers who divide labor.
But specialized treaties are not only about special expertise and the division of labor. Importantly, the creation of antagonistic treaties allows different political preferences (of the political opposition within states, but also of transnational interest groups) to express themselves on the international level. 47 In fact, some treaties have been, in political terms, explicitly designed as "counter-conventions" to others. For example, the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions of 2005 seeks to mitigate the WTO-regime, 48 after the attempt of some negotiating states such as Canada and France to insert into the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and GATT an exception culturelle has failed. 49 In the same sense, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety of 2000 is a counter-convention to WTO.
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The resulting "regime collisions" 51 are praiseworthy because they manifest and further promote pluralism, contestation, and politicization-but it remains to be discussed what this means in normative terms (see Section 11).
A related benefit is the competitive pressure exercised by fragmentation: competition between regimes, organizations, courts, and any other institutions may promote productive exploration and experimentation, enhances creativity, allows for correcting mistakes, reduces the risk of failure of one single institution, and thus overall leads to improved performance, notably to better lawmaking and law-application.
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The next positive aspect of fragmentation is the protection it furnishes against concentrations of power. While it has been asserted that the existence of multiple institutions tends to favor big states which possess sufficient manpower and expertise to staff those numerous institutions, any institutional dispersal in the first place helps to prevent abuse because it constitutes a separation of powers with the possibility of checks and balances.
Furthermore, accountability is increased by the existence of more and "new opportunities for dissatisfied parties to challenge existing rules."
53 Some forum-shopping may legitimately serve as a "counterinsurgency strategy" of weaker actors. When, for example, access to life-saving medicine is not only debated in the WTO but also in the UN Human Rights Council, fragmentation is employed by less powerful actors as a force for contestation within the system. 54 Notably, international judges themselves have welcomed the multiplicity of international courts and tribunals. 55 Of course, much depends on how the judges and arbitrators make use of the case-law of other, potentially competing bodies (see further Section 8). But in any case the sheer higher number of international courts and tribunals leads to more pronouncements, and thus simply to more case-law. The number of decision-makers, their multiplicity, and their competition and rivalry will normally lead to a denser body of law, which also includes more sophistication, and a further elucidation of fundamental principles underpinning the order. 56 This produces a (relatively speaking) finetuned international law which is adequate to the situation at hand. For example, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR mentioning the "overriding importance" of jus cogens 57 has presumably pushed the ICJ to at least referencing these norms after a long period of reluctance. 58 The density and sophistication improves predictability which in turn helps realize the rule of law.
To conclude, fragmentation (and the pluralism going with it) may enhance both the effectiveness and the legitimacy of international law and its application-but only when it is channeled by appropriate principles and procedures to which we turn now.
Conflict resolution: either-or
This section describes how the fragmentation of international law is being successfully managed with help of principles and procedures dealing with discrepancy, collisions, and conflict. I will first turn to the traditional devices of conflict resolution that are geared at binary ("either-or") solutions, leading to the application of one norm over a potentially conflicting other norm stemming from a different source or regime.
"Horizontal" techniques
The first set of traditional juridical principles for resolving conflicts among norms are the priority of the lex specialis (the treaty that deals more specifically with a matter shall prevail), 59 and the priority of the lex posterior (the treaty later in time shall prevail). The priority of the lex specialis is mainly justified by gains in legitimacy: special norms are normally better tailored for the regulation of an issue, and special institutions are normally better equipped to apply them. 60 This proximity (in terms of substance and in terms of regional culture) may enhance acceptance and thus increase compliance rates.
However, in the international legal system, in which norms are produced in a decentralized way, both the specialty rule and the later-in-time rule seem less adequate than in a domestic system, 61 for two principal reasons. First, the later rule (the later treaty) may have been created by totally different actors than the earlier one, and therefore its making does not imply a decision to supersede or undo the prior norm (which might still be favored by its actual creators). A second reason is that the different treaties pursue different objectives, and therefore it can hardly be said that they relate to the same "subject matter"-although this would be a precondition for applying either the lex specialis or the lex posterior rule. 62 Also, principles developed in the field of conflict of law (private international law) have been relied on for deciding which treaty to apply over another one. 63 Moreover, the choice-of-law-principles could be used for resolving "diagonal conflicts" between special international law on the one hand, and domestic law of a different field on the other, for example conflicts between WTO procurement law and domestic environmental law. 64 The private international law-model is heterarchical in a double sense: not only are there a plurality of law-appliers (e.g., domestic courts) which do not stand in a hierarchical relationship to each other, but moreover they each apply their own collision rules which do not necessarily coincide.
A similar principle has been developed for dealing with discrepancies between international law and domestic law, namely the principle of the prevalence of any higher domestic standard. 65 This principle could be applied mutatis mutandis to the relations between different treaty regimes. Its use would result in the application of only one provision and not the other, but this prevalence would not depend on the formal source of the provisions at stake, but on their contents.
All these conflict resolutions maxims constitute a relationship of mutual exclusiveness of treaties. Gunther Teubner writes that this "strictly heterarchical conflict resolution," coming in two forms-either internalizing disputes into the decisions of the regimes or externalizing them to "inter-regime negotiations"-constitutes the only available "meta-constitutionalism" of the international realm. 
Hierarchy
The second traditional conflict resolution is hierarchy. In a system of normative hierarchy, the higher norm is applied, and the other not at all; this device is therefore as "binary" as the ones described in the preceding section. Hierarchy has only an extremely limited scope of application in international law, as shall be briefly recalled. Empirical study of different branches of international law shows that a "trumping" impact of hierarchically superior norms is limited. 67 In practice, notably ius cogens plays a much softer, non-hierarchical role, for example as a guideline for the interpretation of other norms. 68 The precedence of the UN-Charter over conflicting obligations of the member states is mitigated by the legal presumption of an absence of conflict, 69 by the intrinsic exception of ius cogens to the prevailing effect of the Charter, 70 and by the reluctance to accord precedence to the Charter over contrary customary law (as opposed to countervailing "agreements" which are mentioned in article 103 UN Charter 71 ). A different type of hierarchy is foreseen by "more favorable provision"-clauses. Various human rights treaties and also the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety explicitly state that if a different treaty in a related matter sets a different standard, the higher standard shall prevail. 72 This type of "relative" priority is laudable because it allows for a race to the top.
An institutional supplement to normative hierarchy would be the establishment of a hierarchical judicial system in international law. Most institutional propositions seeking to counteract fragmentation have favored the ICJ. 73 In fact, the so-called World Court has the broadest subject matter jurisdiction (not limited to a special area of international law), even if it neither has the broadest membership nor the most developed case-law (there is low density due to the small quantity of cases). One proposal was to introduce a reference procedure by granting the ICJ jurisdiction to render advisory opinions requested by other international tribunals, possibly through the UN Security Council or the General Assembly. 74 Not only the rendering of advisory opinions but already the anticipation of them by other courts and tribunals might prompt those to "consider the issues before them not only from within the mindset of their particular regime, but also from an external frame of reference." 75 In such "a model of reflexive engagement," the ICJ could play an important role in connecting different regulatory regimes. 76 However, this proposal has attracted much criticism 77 and was a political non-starter.
To conclude, a clear (substantive, procedural, or institutional) hierarchy which could resolve normative conflicts has not really emerged, and a further future maturation seems unlikely.
Mutual recognition and the principle of constitutional tolerance
A number of principles or formulas used in treaty provisions and judicial decisions for coordinating different legal (sub-)orders or regimes may be gathered under the heading of "constitutional tolerance."
78 These formulas have originally been developed by (European and domestic) courts and by scholars dealing with the multiplicity of legal orders (national and supranational or regional ones) in Europe.
One source of inspiration is the marge d'appréciation left to national authorities by the ECtHR when it scrutinizes whether national measures are in conformity with the ECHR. Such a marge d'appréciation can and should also be accorded when assessing the compatibility of different international treaty regimes with one another. Applied to the relationship and interaction of various subfields of international law, granting such a leeway means to let the "other" regime's rule stand, and to tolerate the "other" monitoring body's assessment. Just as the traditional margin of appreciation, this type of tolerance is apt to accommodate fragmentation and pluralism by preserving a space in which cultural, political, and regional differences might play. This technique is not in the least motivated by the insight that the "closer" institutions are better equipped and more legitimated to apply the law (including the norms of a "foreign" regime) than those which are further away from the concrete dispute. The ECtHR expressed this (still with a view to the relationship between the domestic authorities and its own monitoring role) as follows: "The national authorities have a direct democratic legitimation and are, as the Court has held on many occasions, in principle better placed than an international court to evaluate local needs and conditions." A related approach is mutual trust or confidence, leading to mutual recognition, based on the acceptance of a functional equivalence of norms originating from different sources. This approach has been developed with a view to the coordination of EU law with member state law, and member state law inter se. It has so far been used to tolerate (within limits) diverse human rights standards. 80 The reasoning can be illustrated by the example of the European arrest warrant. 81 The starting point is the premise that the EU is founded on shared values, notably with regard to human rights. 82 Therefore, all member states can (and must) presume that other member states are in compliance with those common (shared) standards.
83 Also, they may (and must) have "mutual confidence"
84 that the other members will grant if not identical but "equivalent protection"
85 to those values. Therefore, they must recognize other member state's activity relating to a given problem (principle of "mutual recognition"), 86 must cooperate in implementing the relevant legal acts of the EU, and are-importantly-prohibited from checking or scrutinizing whether the "other" member state really (fully) complied with the shared standard or its equivalence.
87 They are notably normally not allowed to demand a higher level of protection than foreseen by the relevant EU legal act. But under certain conditions, and on the basis of an individual assessment, they may exceptionally do so and refuse implementation or cooperation on this ground. In the field of extradition on the basis of a European arrest warrant, the German Federal Constitutional Court spectacularly held that mutual trust could be shaken and thus the presumption of 
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EU Accession Opinion 2/13, supra note 83, ¶ 192: ". . . when implementing EU law, the Member States may, under EU law, be required to presume that fundamental rights have been observed by the other Member States, so that not only may they not demand a higher level of national protection of fundamental rights from another Member State than provided by EU law, but, save in exceptional cases, they may not check whether that other member state has actually, in the specific case, observed the fundamental rights guaranteed by the EU." (emphases added). The premise of this approach is the existence of a sufficient set of shared minimum values. The courts in Europe which apply the mutual recognition approach regularly rely on shared European values. Although the universal value basis is surely much thinner, I do not see a categorical difference here. In principle, the idea of mutual recognition can be reasonably applied to other inter-regime relations. This means that different standards, for example of fair trial, in different regimes (e.g., in the UN as opposed to in the EU) should be mutually recognized as long as a minimal threshold is not undercut. The idea of mutual recognition on the basis of a presumption of normative equivalence could even be extended beyond the protection of fundamental rights to other standards, such as the standards of democracy and the rule of law.
However, this approach fits only when the norms in question do not point into opposite directions (for example the free importation of animal products versus import restrictions on the basis of animal cruelty concerns), but when they strive towards the same goal but with different nuances (e.g., protection of property, only in different degrees). Importantly, the questions remain what constitutes "normative equivalence," when the presumption of equivalence is rebutted (notably whether the rebuttal hinges on the individual case or on systemic deficiencies), and most of all who determines the two former issues. In this affair, the German Federal Constitutional Court was not satisfied that human dignity was fully protected in Italy due to the possibility of an in absentia sentencing with an up to thirty-year prison sentence for drug dealing. Therefore, the Constitutional Court struck down the extradition order of a lower German court for unconstitutionality and remanded the case. The judgment has been dubbed "identity control I," because the Court for the first time actually applied the "identity" of the German constitution (with the protection of human dignity forming part of this identity) as a benchmark. 
Rapprochement: developing common standards
In contrast to all techniques mentioned up to now, another set of techniques and procedures to deal with potential discrepancies or even conflict of international norms stemming from different regimes are those which seek to bring in line, to reconcile, or "integrate" different regimes, thereby avoiding the binary choice to apply one provision and not the other. Put differently, these techniques are geared towards the cumulative application of norms arising from different regimes. Unlike the conflict resolution modes (Section 5) and the mutual recognition mode (Section 6), the rapprochementtechniques seek to create compatibility, not only in a "negative" sense, but also in a supportive ("positive") sense for the achievement of the objectives of other treaties.
Conventional and customary rules of rapprochement
The clearest manifestation of this approach is found in the three principles enounced in article 20 of the UNESCO Convention on Diversity of 2005 whose heading is: "Relationship to other treaties: mutual supportiveness, complementarity and non-subordination."
91 These three principles favor the combined application of the UNESCO Convention and other treaties.
"Notwithstanding-clauses" in the style of article 2(3) of the Cartagena Protocol 92 may ultimately work in the same direction, namely that of cumulative application and mutual harmonization. 93 Cross-referrals such as articles 6(2) and 22(3) of the ICCPR (mentioning other human rights treaties) have a similar effect. Furthermore, article 44 and 46 ICCPR and article 24 ICESCR seek to prevent that the functions of UN organs and bodies dealing with human rights generally are impaired by the two Human Rights Covenants and their treaty bodies. Another example is article 104 NAFTA, which seeks to promote the reconciliation of potentially conflicting obligations arising out of the free trade agreement on the one hand and environmental and conservation agreements on the other hand, by explicitly prescribing a balancing approach (albeit with a heavy thumb on the scale in favor of trade).
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Reconciliatory principles that are applicable across the board smooth out tensions and frictions. For example, the principle of sustainable development is intended to 91 See UNESCO Convention on Diversity, supra note 48. See similarly Cartagena Protocol, supra note 50, preamble indent 9: "recognizing that trade and environment agreements should be mutually supportive." reconcile the frictions notably between the international law of development and international environmental law. 95 Or, the antagonist legal concepts of sovereignty/ non-intervention on the one hand and human rights/human security on the other hand are synthesized in the soft law concept of responsibility to protect (R2P). However, the application of these reconciliatory principles cannot in itself resolve any concrete normative conflict but can only prevent the total eclipsing of one of the regimes or principles involved.
A related phenomenon is due to the acknowledgment that international human rights matter for basically all issue-areas and subfields of international law. This insight continues to motivate both formal revisions of special norms so as to accommodate human rights concerns, and novel interpretations.
96 Such a human rightsmainstreaming also has a mentating effect. 97 Cognate to the employment of human rights as a mainstreaming device is Dirk Pulkowski's idea to understand a small number of basic concepts of international law (such as "sovereignty," the "right to have human rights," or specific provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) or the UN Charter 98 ) as "constitutive rules" which create the very possibility of meaningful legal discourse. These will engender "communicative compatibility" rather than legal unity. 99 An important phenomenon are references in international treaties (or in the caselaw; see on "judicial dialogue" below) to general international law (possibly fundamental and thus to some extent "constitutional" principles), and cross-references to other (special) treaties or regimes. A historical example is article 1 of the Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization of 1948 100 which referred to the UN Charter's objective of attaining economic and social progress and development. 101 example of a referral to general international law is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) preamble affirming "that matters not regulated by this Convention continue to be governed by the rules and principles of general international law."
103 An example for cross-referencing is that regulations on sea pollution adopted under the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) 104 and resolutions of the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) under the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 105 count as accepted "international rules and standards" in the sense of articles 211 and 217-220 UNCLOS, the provisions dealing with maritime pollution and accidents. A final example of cross-referencing occurs between international labor and international trade conventions. So far, nearly forty bilateral trade law agreements invoke labor provisions of various International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions, and some of them actually incorporate the labor standards directly. 106 But in the absence of a central institution which would authoritatively interpret such cross-referenced and "borrowed" clauses, and the reconciliatory and "constitutive" principles, the specter of divergent and thus "fragmented" interpretation arises. This leads us to the interpretative devices.
Interpretation Maxims
Two principal interpretation maxims are being used by law-applying bodies to avoid conflict by harmonizing the various international rules rooted in different regimes.
(a) Presumption of law-abiding intentions?
The first technique is a presumption of law-abidingness. It has long been employed by the ICJ which stated that "[i]t is a rule of interpretation that a text emanating from a Government must, in principle, be interpreted as producing and as intended to produce effects in accordance with existing law and not in violation of it." 107 In Al-Jedda, the ECtHR established a presumption which leads to the avoidance (or negation) of any conflict between an ECHR member state's obligation to carry out a Security Council resolution and that state's obligation to secure the ECHR rights:
Resolution, the Court must therefore choose the interpretation which is most in harmony with the requirements of the Convention and which avoids any conflict of obligations.
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This presumption differs from the Bosphorus-presumption 109 mentioned above. In the Al-Dulimi case, the Chamber had in 2013 relied on Bosphorus, 110 and had argued that states' measures implementing obligations arising out of their UN-membership could be presumed to be in conformity with the ECHR, but only if the organization guarantees an "equivalent protection" to human rights as the Convention itself.
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That kind of presumption, based on the idea of mutual confidence as explained above (Section 6), will lead to the maintenance of multiple similar ("equivalent") standards without asking for their complete alignment.
In contrast, the ECtHR's Grand Chamber in Al-Dulimi presumed law-abiding intentions of the Security Council. 112 The Grand Chamber here stated that:
[W]here a Security Council resolution does not contain any clear or explicit wording excluding or limiting respect for human rights in the context of the implementation of sanctions against individuals or entities at national level, the Court must always presume that those measures are compatible with the Convention.
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Unlike the Bosphorus-presumption, the Al-Jedda/Al-Dulimi-presumption does not look at the objective features of an "other," colliding regime (which in Bosphorus was the EU; in Al-Dulimi it would be the UN sanctions scheme), but at the "intention" of the Security Council to allow for implementing action which safeguards human rights. The statement that "the Court must always presume that those measures are compatible with the Convention" means that the ECtHR must presume that the Security Council sanction decision allows the member states to implement the Security Council decision in a way that is compatible with the ECHR.
This presumption of an allowance for member states to go on with a human rightsfriendly implementation of Security Council resolutions has two important legal consequences. The first consequence is the inapplicability of article 103 of the UN Charter. As the Grand Chamber in Al-Dulimi said, the Court "will in principle conclude that there is no conflict of obligations capable of engaging the primacy rule in Article 103 of the UN Charter." 114 The second consequence of the presumption is that it permits the ECtHR to avoid examining whether the UN itself currently offers "equivalent protection" to the ECHR-a question which would obviously have to be answered in the negative for the time being. With help of the strained reconciliation of the obligations flowing from Security Council Resolution 1438 115 (which was at stake in Al-Dulimi) on the one hand and the ECHR on the other hand, and by denying any "real conflict" between the States' obligations under both treaty regimes, the Grand Chamber in Al-Dulimi sought to render "nugatory the question whether the equivalent protection test should be applied." 116 This "law-abiding"-presumption had already previously been applied by the ECtHR for managing the tension between the law of immunities and the human right of access to a court under article 6 ECHR. In the Srebrenica-case, the ECtHR found that the human right had been restricted in a proportionate manner and not violated. This result was not owed to a normative hierarchy. Rather, the ECtHR reached it through the interpretation of the human rights provision "in harmony" with preexisting "generally recognized rules" of international law, based on the presumption that the state parties of the ECHR did not want to depart from their previous obligations under general international law (namely the obligation to grant immunity to the United Nations).
117 (In contrast, the Dutch Supreme court had taken a hierarchy-based approach and had relied on Art. 103 UN Charter to justify an "absolute" immunity of the United Nations.
)
The presumption of law-abiding intentions (of the Security Council, or of States) faces the same objection that was raised against the lex posterior rule: Without an identity of law-makers, the presumption has no basis in their actual intentions. It is therefore more a legal fiction than a presumption.
(b) Systemic interpretation
The currently most discussed "de-fragmentation" technique is the systemic interpretation of international norms. 119 For treaty interpretation, article 31(3)(c) VCLT prescribes that "[t]here shall be taken into account: . . . c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties." International law-applying bodies have often practiced harmonious interpretation (that is interpreting "their" body of law in the light of a different regime's special rules, or in conformity with general international law), while not necessarily relying on article 31(3)(c) VCLT. For example, the WTO Appellate Body famously stated that the GATT "is not to be read in clinical isolation from public international law." in the light of general international law, to the effect that the "measures" there precluded an unlawful use of force by one party against the other. 121 In Hassan, a case on deprivation of liberty in armed conflict, the ECtHR "harmonized" the ECHR with the rules of international humanitarian law (IHL). The result of the interpretation of article 5 ECHR "in harmony with other rules of international law of which it forms part" 122 was that, during international armed conflict, a person may be detained even in the absence of a particular ground permitting deprivation of liberty (although such a specific ground is required by the wording of article 5 ECHR), when this would be allowed by rules of IHL. 123 Since the prominent discussion of that "master-key" to the house of international law 124 in the ILC fragmentation report of 2006, parties to disputes more often rely on that VCLT-provision, and it is now often quoted in decisions. Arguably, article 31 VCLT allows, and even mandates, treaty interpreters to take into account of all kinds of "rules of international law," not only other treaty norms but also customary norms 125 and possibly even soft law. 126 Importantly, reliance on such "outside" norms does not constitute an unlawful extension of the limited jurisdiction of the monitoring bodies, 127 because these norms are not applied "directly" but only "indirectly," as interpretative devices for the proper construction of the regime-specific rules. 128 "Systemic integration" is adequate for the application of customary rules as well, for example for the identification of the scope of state immunity with due consideration for human rights. 129 The precondition of article 31 VCLT and its underlying principle, namely that the rule be "applicable in the relations between the parties," has infamously been construed narrowly by the WTO Biotech panel. That panel noted that the Cartagena Protocol, on which the European Community as a respondent had relied for interpreting the pertinent WTO Agreements, was in fact "not applicable," because the Protocol had not been ratified by a number of WTO members, including the complaining parties to the dispute (United States, Argentina, and Canada). 130 The Biotech panel's parallelism requirement (finding that a treaty norm can only be taken into account as an interpretative guideline in a WTO-related dispute when all parties to that dispute-or even all parties to the WTO Agreement which must be interpreted-have ratified that other treaty) would render article 31(3) VCLT largely meaningless. This approach would make other treaties non-usable for the interpretation of treaties with a broad membership, such as the WTO Agreement (which, moreover, has also non-state members which cannot accede to most other international treaties). The narrow reading would in addition have the paradoxical result that the more universal a treaty is, the smaller the chance that it could "meet" other treaties would be. The Biotech decision has largely been appraised as a political decision to "keep out" international environmental law from WTO law and as expressing a political preference for free trade. The better, and meanwhile prevailing, view is that it is not necessary that all states in the organization/treaty are also parties to the other treaty to make the latter usable, if they are not involved in the dispute.
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The next question is what "taking into account" actually means. Arguably, this means that the interpreter must engage in balancing. 132 For example, when an investor claims a violation of the "fair and equitable treatment-standard" embodied in a BIT, the tribunals must determine the fairness and equitableness through balancing the legitimate expectations of the investor against other rules and principles of international law, including human rights law.
133
This observation dovetails with the International Law Commission's overall assessment of the "principle of systemic integration" (manifest in article 31(3)(c) VCLT) as presupposing and implying some sense of a global common good:
The principle of systemic integration . . . articulates the legal-institutional environment in view of substantive preferences, distributionary choices and political objectives. This articulation is . . . important for the critical and constructive development of international institutions . . . . To hold those institutions as fully isolated from each other . . . is to think of law only as an instrument for attaining regime-objectives. But law is also about protecting rights and enforcing obligations, above all rights and obligations that have a backing in something like a general, public interest. Without the principle of "systemic integration" it would be impossible to give expression to and to keep alive, any sense of the common good of humankind, not reducible to the good of any particular institution or "regime." . It conceded that a bilateral 1992 agreement between the US and the EC was applicable between the parties, because "the parties" in art. 31(3)(c) VCLT (supra note 98) meant parties to the dispute (not necessarily all WTO parties), but that its provision was not "relevant", and therefore did not have to be taken into account for interpreting the term "benefit" in art. 
Integration by the judiciary

The concept of judicial dialogue
The most discussed "procedure" or vessel for promoting the integration of different regimes is judicial dialogue. This is itself informal but could be encouraged and facilitated through institutional formats. Judicial dialogue basically means courts' mutual attentiveness to each other's case-law and cross-citations. Such cross-references and the parallel resort to the surrounding "general" international law have the effect of lining different treaties up with each other and/or to direct them towards respect of shared principles. For example, the principle of national treatment exists both in WTO law and investment law, and cross-citations have the effect of consolidating its meaning in the sense of a shared content. Overall, such an "interjudicial dialogue . . . has the potential to preserve the unity of the international legal system in face of fragmentation."
135 This integrative effect would seem to work even if courts do not necessarily cite one another for the purpose of communicating ("dialoguing") but for quite other reasons (such as gaining acceptance by colleagues on the bench), and even if the citations are, as often, selective. 136 Importantly, the "global community of courts" would need to encompass not only international courts and tribunals but also domestic ones applying international and foreign law in order to bring about a "global" jurisprudence. 137 Moreover, the dialogue could and should be conducted among other participants of the "international interpretive community," comprising also transnational non state actors. 138 In judicial practice, the "systemic outlook" has been asked for by some judges. 139 ICJ Judge Greenwood demanded that international courts actively espouse each other's case-law:
International law is not a series of fragmented specialist and self-contained bodies of law, each of which functions in isolation from the others. It is a single unified system of law and each international court can, and should, draw on the jurisprudence of other international courts and tribunals, even though it is not bound necessarily to come to the same conclusions.
The ILC study on fragmentation put it thus: [T] hat conflicts between specialized regimes may be overcome by law, even as the law may not go much further than require a willingness to listen to others, take their points of view into account and to find a reasoned resolution at the end. 141 On a more abstract level, what is happening here, and what should be welcomed and encouraged, is the internalization of an outside perspective. Gunther Teubner observes that the differentiation and autonomization of "systems" (which seem to include the various international treaty regimes) has resulted in a "network architecture" of transnational regimes. The important analytical and normative point now is that "each regime needs to combine two contradictory requirements": All regimes spell out their own vision of a global public interest (from their own perspective), while all regimes "at the same time take account of the whole by transcending their individual perspective." "Each regime must create the overarching ordre public transnational from its own perspective," a "shared horizon of meaning" needs to be constructed, a "counterfactual assumption of a common normative core." 
The practice
Detailed empirical analyses of judicial and arbitral practice relating to concrete legal questions touching upon various subfields have been undertaken only recently. They point predominantly towards integration rather than to disintegration.
There seem to be only few instances where international courts have been uncooperative. And even the notorious example for a jealous protection of own jurisdiction, the Mox Plant case, in which the ECJ penalized Ireland for seizing the ITLOS, 143 may have in the end resulted in a further development of the environmental precautionary principle and may thus have refined international law. 144 The only known example of facially irreconcilable interpretations of a cross-cutting norm by different courts, namely the diverging concretizations of the term "control" in article 8 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility by the ICJ and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), has not caused any damage either. While the Tadić tribunal had satisfied itself with an "overall control," 145 the ICJ asked, more exactingly, for "effective control." 146 But because the legal context and purpose for identifying "control" differed in both cases (for establishing state responsibility or individual responsibility) there was no outright contradiction. On the other hand, cross-citations by international courts are probably increasing. For example, the European Court of Human Rights regularly applies international human rights norms other than the ECHR (the Children's Rights Convention, the Refugee Convention, the CCPR, the Convention against Torture [CAT] 147 ), the law on state immunity, IHL, and provisions of "general" international law (law of treaties and norms on the ICJ procedure). 148 Inversely, the ICTY relied, in its early decision on torture, on the ECtHR case-law. It then developed its own concept, realizing that the broad concept of torture as used in human rights law was not adequate for a criminal law definition which must satisfy strict standards of legality. 149 In the area of international economic law, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) global principles on responsible sovereign lending and borrowing practices have been invoked in an arbitration involving sovereign debt. 150 In the WTO dispute settlement body's practice, ideas and norms from other regimes have been "imported" into the trade system. 151 Inversely, an "export" of WTO norms to other regimes has been taking place. Gabrielle Marceau and co-authors have found a strong influence of WTO rules and case-law on regional and international dispute settlement in other areas of international economic law (investment law and non-WTO trade law). The substantive WTO acquis has "overwhelmingly" been used by trade and investment courts and tribunals. 152 The reason for referencing the WTO seem to be both "functional closeness" of the issue-areas, the "authority" of the WTO in international economic law, and the judges and arbitrators' "interest in maintaining to normative and interregime coherence, which might very well be intrinsic to legal reasoning itself." 153 With regard to the overlap and friction between international human rights law and international investment protection law, Christina Binder found that the mutual references of the involved conflict-resolving bodies (the ECtHR and arbitral tribunals) are fairly scarce but that both bodies of jurisprudence are solidly embedded in the general part of international law so that there is "no threat to the unity of international law." 154 In 2013, Philippa Webb published a solid study of the case-law of four courts (the ICJ, the ICC, the ICTY, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)), which have been developing the law in three areas: genocide, immunities, and the use of force. 155 Webb diagnosed both divergences and convergence and concluded that "there are few instances of genuine fragmentation in the areas examined. The overall picture is one of genuine integration."
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A 2015 across-the-board study with contributions, inter alia, by eminent judges from various courts diagnoses a "reassertion and convergence" in international law growing out of the differentiation into substantive subfields and the proliferation of courts and tribunals. 157 The editors claim that public international law "has grown from bilateral relationships, to something that is surely no more fragmented than it once was; international law has only become more diverse." 158 The overwhelming impression is that, although the lack of a central lawmaker has (inevitably) led to the existence of multiple legal regimes with overlapping but not identical memberships, whose main objectives often stand in tension, the law-appliers (both treaty bodies and courts) are careful not to contradict each other. The empirical findings on the scarcity of conflicts outsized by the prevailing scheme of parallelism and reconciliation of norms from different regimes, and also the observation of migration of norms from one regime to another suggest that the problems of fragmentation have been overstated. But they also show that much depends on the behavior of courts and tribunals.
Non-judicial "regime interaction"
Outside concrete disputes, treaty bodies and organizations appear to entertain contacts all the while renouncing on laying down guidelines for the resolution of potential conflicts. The minimal prerequisite for coordination and possible cooperation seems to be information-exchange-potentially with a view to identify possible common goals (or sub-goals) and shared principles. Importantly, the interaction of regimes should be conceived of not as a managerial problem but as a political issue. The quest for respect of the mentioned procedural principles has been disparaged as a part of an inevitably hegemonizing strategy employed by the protagonists of one regime (e.g., trade) over another (e.g., species protection) to falsely represent that regimes' objectives as universal, in order to swallow up the competing ones. 171 But this is a one-sided interpretation of the phenomenon. To the contrary, the principles of inclusion and transparency 172 are precisely apt to counteract the dominance of that regime which is in political terms more powerful than the competing one. This leads to the issue of politics. legitimacy for making politics. From that perspective, both the culpability of courts for any fragmentation, and the hopes placed on them for de-fragmentation efforts seem to unduly depoliticize the processes. The argument then would be that deep normative conflicts arising from the fragmentation of international law could and should be resolved "politically" (by the global lawmakers which are still mainly the states) and not "technically" (by international courts and tribunals).
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Against the background of these diverse and even contradictory claims about fragmentation and politics which suffer from a lack of specification of what is meant with the ambiguous terms "politics" and "political," I submit that the process of fragmentation has usefully brought politics back in 176 -it has led to a politicization of international legal processes. Politicization is here understood as a process through which certain issues become objects of public contention and debate. 177 Politicization in and of the international or transnational realm starts from the perception that choices can and must be made (as opposed to purely "automatic" reactions) about the appropriate collective action, institutions, and procedures to regulate the social condition and shared problems. 178 Because politicization introduces new demands for resources, justice, or recognition, the process is inevitably contestatory. Contestation refers to "activities that resist political and theoretical claims to final, universal, or absolute solutions to political dilemmas." 179 The crucial observation now is that regime collisions typically give rise to processes of political contestation. 180 When, for example, the rules of free trade collide with rules on the protection of natural resources, the proponents of one regime resort to fundamental principles in order to make their case before a broader public.
"Contested collisions" thus force the actors concerned to refer to fundamental values and basic principles if they want to make an impact on public discourse . . . the implicit logic of regime collisions tends to induce the actors towards "going public." 181 More even, clever arbitrators and judges will anticipate the risk of public critique and will try-at least in rhetorical terms-to take on board the competing concerns. 182 For this reason, "underdog regimes" which-due to the uneven judicialization of the subfields of international law-cannot compete on an equal footing with others (for example, the international regime of environment protection which is not equipped with a specialized tribunal or court) typically go public. They mobilize sympathetic publics and thereby force also the other side (e.g., the protagonists of free trade) to argue its case on a principled basis. 183 Ironically, such resort to principles and to the common good can be seen as an important source of constitutionalization.
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Conclusions
As it is typical for the evolution of the law and the accompanying discourse, we have been witnessing a dialectical process: The initial enthusiastic greeting of the explosion of issue-areas and the flowering of new legal instruments and institutions was followed by a fear of fragmentation which is now, in a third phase, tempered by a sober analysis of the risks and opportunities of fragmentation (recte refinement)-by its "normalization." 185 Arguably, the perception of fragmentation as a problem for international law grew out of a misguided assumption that international law must be fully coherent to be effective and legitimate. The subsequent more neutral analysts then spoke of a "widening and thickening of the context of international law," 186 and of a "more diverse" international law. 187 The resulting state of international law was (appropriately) described as an "ordered pluralism," 188 as a "unitas multiplex," 189 or as "flexible diversity."
What is now needed is a continuous improvement of the strategies of coordination of different legal fields and levels of law, a refinement of the techniques for the avoidance of conflict, and clever mechanisms for resolving the unavoidable ones, in the absence of a clear normative hierarchy. Also, the relevant actors must be willing "to justify interpretations of regional, global, or relevant domestic law in general rather than parochial terms,"
192 and to internalize outside perspectives. Accepting that " [t] here is no God's Eye Point of view that we can know or usefully imagine,"
193 then the plurality of the view-points of actors involved in global governance need not only be seen as inevitable, but may even be appreciated as beneficial. Espousing such a perspectival pluralism in turn suggests qualifying the plurality of institutions and of their legal acts, the policy results, frictions, and conflicts created by the multiplicity of sites, actors, and acts, no longer as "fragmentation" but as a refinement of international law. For example, rather than considering the ICTY Appeals Chamber Tadič decision on jurisdiction as a hallmark of fragmentation, because the ICTY here asserted that "[i]n international law, every tribunal is a self-contained system,"
194 it should be cherished that this decision has contributed to the amelioration of UN law by subjecting the UN Security Council to legal limits. 195 Related to the shift of episteme lying in the shift of terminology, and equally important, is the espousal of a pluralism of values. The realization of a stark value diversity among different international institutions had initially given rise to concern for the legitimacy of the international legal order as a whole, once the belief in state sovereignty as the necessary and sufficient basic principle of international law had got lost. The fragmentation debate grew out of this concern over legitimacy deficits arising from internal contradictions and norm conflicts, and the coordinating procedures and devices which are currently developed are at least implicitly addressing this concern, too.
Overall, the debate has turned around international law's legitimacy-in the sense of an external standard of propriety and fairness. At the same time, a broad range of views about the content of that standard, ranging from internal consistency overstate equality to respect for human rights persists. Even democratic principles could and in my view should be taken as a standard of legitimacy of the international legal order, but this standard tends to be neglected as a result of the dominance of international courts in operating the integration of the various regimes. While some strands of the debate have in an unhelpful way glossed over, denied, or depoliticized conflicts over values, principles, and priorities among participants in the global legal discourse, the lasting achievement of the debate 192 Cohen, supra note 78, at 73. 193 has been to exactly pinpoint the politics that are at stake. The lens of "refinement" allows accepting and reassessing diversity, conflict, and even contradiction as a positive condition which manifests and facilitates the realization of the values of critique and contestation within international law.
